> Is the colour you see the same as what I see? It’s a question that has puzzled both philosophers and neuroscientists for decades, but has proved notoriously difficult to answer.
> Now, a study that recorded patterns of brain activity in 15 participants suggests that colours are represented and processed in the same way in the brains of different people.
They're not asking the same question though. Neuroscientists are asking whether the brain processes the physical substrate (photons) that precedes the experience in the same way. Philosophers are asking if the subjective experience that follows (the qualia) is identical. The former is the easy question. The latter is the impossible question.
The article may be philosophically ignorant, but there's still value in the findings here. It answers the question in a limited sense: if materialism is ultimately true, then your blue is approximately my blue because the physical brain state is the consciousness.
In fact, I think the latter is an even easier question. People’s subjective experience of colors is obviously different across a large enough population. Colorblindness and synesthesia alone prove as much.
> Now, a study that recorded patterns of brain activity in 15 participants suggests that colours are represented and processed in the same way in the brains of different people.
Interesting, but I'm not convinced that it actually settles (would settle, if the "suggestion" is confirmed) the philosophical question.
Imagine I built a machine that allowed you to see colors exactly how another person perceived them. You look through Bob's eyes and see that his blue is your blue.
Then I notice a loose screw and tighten it. Now you see Bob's blue as orange.
Was the machine properly functioning with the screw loose or tightened? Was it properly functioning in either configuration? How would you prove it?
We see different blues, obviously. We've got millions of RGB receptors in our eyes, each receptor has a unique color response. We are not machines, after all, made of identical transistors.
Yeah, I understand the limitation. But that is an irrelevant objection (is my point), since we already know that the color blind don't see the same colors - and know it at an objective level even (they can't discern them from totally different colors when asked for example).
The study is meant for people with typical vision. Might as well object that they didn't include the blind...
Blind from birth, sure. A bit off topic, but a person who has experienced colors normally and later become blind could still imagine seeing the colors, and that would likely produce the same activation pattern, at least in some parts of the brain.
Then there’s the fact that some people are unable to distinguish between blue and green colors, because their language uses the same word for both. They simply cannot perceive the colors being different. How would they compare?
That's what the study addresses (even if inconclusively).
The question is how "but they didn't include color blind people" has any relevance to the subject.
For color blind people we already know that they don't see the same colors, so the answer for them is trivial. They can't even decode the same input, so nobody expects them to have the same color qualia as someone who does.
The purpose of the study is to examine the color of people with same typical vision capabilities. So regarding the objection, it's like some team doing a pitch perception study and someone asks why the deaf weren't included!
> Is the colour you see the same as what I see? It’s a question that has puzzled both philosophers and neuroscientists for decades, but has proved notoriously difficult to answer.
> Now, a study that recorded patterns of brain activity in 15 participants suggests that colours are represented and processed in the same way in the brains of different people.
They're not asking the same question though. Neuroscientists are asking whether the brain processes the physical substrate (photons) that precedes the experience in the same way. Philosophers are asking if the subjective experience that follows (the qualia) is identical. The former is the easy question. The latter is the impossible question.
The article may be philosophically ignorant, but there's still value in the findings here. It answers the question in a limited sense: if materialism is ultimately true, then your blue is approximately my blue because the physical brain state is the consciousness.
The latter is an "impossible question" because it's a meaningless question.
It is not a meaningless question? It is a very profound question.
In fact, I think the latter is an even easier question. People’s subjective experience of colors is obviously different across a large enough population. Colorblindness and synesthesia alone prove as much.
This is a classic case of “STEM types please learn the tiniest bit about the humanities before expounding on them”.
> Now, a study that recorded patterns of brain activity in 15 participants suggests that colours are represented and processed in the same way in the brains of different people.
Interesting, but I'm not convinced that it actually settles (would settle, if the "suggestion" is confirmed) the philosophical question.
Agreed. It begs the big question of - does identical brain activity produce identical qualia
I am certain those neural interface folks would be very happy to have an objective answer to this question.
Perhaps it doesn't need to be settled anymore, since it's empirically verified.
Imagine I built a machine that allowed you to see colors exactly how another person perceived them. You look through Bob's eyes and see that his blue is your blue.
Then I notice a loose screw and tighten it. Now you see Bob's blue as orange.
Was the machine properly functioning with the screw loose or tightened? Was it properly functioning in either configuration? How would you prove it?
We see different blues, obviously. We've got millions of RGB receptors in our eyes, each receptor has a unique color response. We are not machines, after all, made of identical transistors.
https://archive.is/z6T7R
I wonder if scientists are more ignorant of philosophy than philosophers are of science, or the other way around?
Either way, both fields really seem to fumble around when they approach the other's domain.
Oh, really? How many color deficient or color blind people were included? :-)
In what way is this relevant?
If you don’t have the cones for a specific frequency of light, how are the corresponding neurons going to light up in an fMRI?
Yeah, I understand the limitation. But that is an irrelevant objection (is my point), since we already know that the color blind don't see the same colors - and know it at an objective level even (they can't discern them from totally different colors when asked for example).
The study is meant for people with typical vision. Might as well object that they didn't include the blind...
Blind from birth, sure. A bit off topic, but a person who has experienced colors normally and later become blind could still imagine seeing the colors, and that would likely produce the same activation pattern, at least in some parts of the brain.
Then there’s the fact that some people are unable to distinguish between blue and green colors, because their language uses the same word for both. They simply cannot perceive the colors being different. How would they compare?
Is my blue your blue? Yes but only if we see the same blue.
That's what the study addresses (even if inconclusively).
The question is how "but they didn't include color blind people" has any relevance to the subject.
For color blind people we already know that they don't see the same colors, so the answer for them is trivial. They can't even decode the same input, so nobody expects them to have the same color qualia as someone who does.
The purpose of the study is to examine the color of people with same typical vision capabilities. So regarding the objection, it's like some team doing a pitch perception study and someone asks why the deaf weren't included!