Anti-fingerprinting measures with configurable knobs is always going to be a risky proposition because those options themselves end up being a fingerprinting surface. It's better to take firefox/tor browser's approach and have a common profile eg. "resistfingerprinting" to get crowd anonymity.
This extension does not allow you to adjust how a given patch works - for the reasons you wrote. You are 100% right. This extension allows you to configure the availability of certain spoofed surfaces for specific sites. Moreover, this extension does not try to override the protections that Firefox uses, e.g. in the case of limits on the presentation of the amount of available RAM.
Your opinion is completely correct if we assume that most users will use Tor Browser. However, it is 2026, and it does not seem that Firefox will regain its position on the market. The idea behind this extension is to provide very basic (relative to what the browser manufacturer could do - and often does not do) protection for users of mainstream browsers. I use Helium and Zen myself, depending on the context of the work I do, but I am aware that most people will reach for a browser whose manufacturer sunsetted Privacy Sandbox a year ago.
>Moreover, this extension does not try to override the protections that Firefox uses, e.g. in the case of limits on the presentation of the amount of available RAM.
This seems contradicted by the screenshots, which lists options for "time", "canvas", and "screen". Firefox's RFP has protections for all of those. Not to mention it has "protections" for APIs that don't even exist on firefox.
Have you thought of active fingerprint pollution? Mathematically, find the search term that has the farthest embedding + noise than your current search term. You search for Harley Davidson, a parallel search is done for "3 mo old diapers".
Like another person said: passive fingerprint protection will be limited.
Thanks for this opinion. You may be right. However, I believe that this type of protection will reach a wider audience in the form of an extension written in TypeScript. If we wanted to dress this code in the form of native code, we would be talking about making a fork of one of the popular browsers. It's a big challenge and a big responsibility.
I believe that the genesis of this type of problems has several reasons:
1) Incorrect implementation of spoofing
2) a family of browser APIs whose context extensions do not (usually) have access to
3) the website owner decided that, for example, to fill out the form, the user must show him the RAM volume, battery charge level or graphics card manufacturer.
Anti-fingerprinting measures with configurable knobs is always going to be a risky proposition because those options themselves end up being a fingerprinting surface. It's better to take firefox/tor browser's approach and have a common profile eg. "resistfingerprinting" to get crowd anonymity.
This extension does not allow you to adjust how a given patch works - for the reasons you wrote. You are 100% right. This extension allows you to configure the availability of certain spoofed surfaces for specific sites. Moreover, this extension does not try to override the protections that Firefox uses, e.g. in the case of limits on the presentation of the amount of available RAM.
Your opinion is completely correct if we assume that most users will use Tor Browser. However, it is 2026, and it does not seem that Firefox will regain its position on the market. The idea behind this extension is to provide very basic (relative to what the browser manufacturer could do - and often does not do) protection for users of mainstream browsers. I use Helium and Zen myself, depending on the context of the work I do, but I am aware that most people will reach for a browser whose manufacturer sunsetted Privacy Sandbox a year ago.
>Moreover, this extension does not try to override the protections that Firefox uses, e.g. in the case of limits on the presentation of the amount of available RAM.
This seems contradicted by the screenshots, which lists options for "time", "canvas", and "screen". Firefox's RFP has protections for all of those. Not to mention it has "protections" for APIs that don't even exist on firefox.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Battery_Sta...
Have you thought of active fingerprint pollution? Mathematically, find the search term that has the farthest embedding + noise than your current search term. You search for Harley Davidson, a parallel search is done for "3 mo old diapers".
Like another person said: passive fingerprint protection will be limited.
The only thing that will protect against fingerprinting is enough people connecting through some type of stock configuration virtual machine.
There's a business value if you implement your patches on C++/source code level.
Thanks for this opinion. You may be right. However, I believe that this type of protection will reach a wider audience in the form of an extension written in TypeScript. If we wanted to dress this code in the form of native code, we would be talking about making a fork of one of the popular browsers. It's a big challenge and a big responsibility.
I find, as time goes on, that more and more sites are breaking over relatively minimal privacy protections in my browser.
I believe that the genesis of this type of problems has several reasons: 1) Incorrect implementation of spoofing 2) a family of browser APIs whose context extensions do not (usually) have access to 3) the website owner decided that, for example, to fill out the form, the user must show him the RAM volume, battery charge level or graphics card manufacturer.